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Official adjustments of the budget balance to the cycle assume that the only category of gov-
ernment spending that responds automatically to the cycle is unemployment compensation. But 
estimates show otherwise. Payments for pensions, sickness, subsistence, invalidity, childcare 
and subsidies of all sorts to firms respond automatically and significantly to the cycle as well. In 
addition, it is fairly common to use official figures for cyclically adjusted budget balances, di-
vide by potential output, and use the resulting ratios to study discretionary fiscal policy. But if 
potential output is not deterministic but subject to supply shocks, then apart from anything else, 
those ratios are inefficient estimates of the cyclically-independent ratios of budget balances di-
vided by potential output. (A fortiori, they are inefficient estimates of the cyclically adjusted 
ratios of budget balances to observed output.) Accordingly, the paper makes use of detailed data 
from the OECD’s Social Expenditure database to produce separate estimates of the impact of 
the cycle on disaggregated components of the budget balance, both in levels and in the form of 
their ratios to output. In addition, we discuss the relation between the two sorts of estimates. 
When the focus is on ratios of expenditure and revenue to output, the cyclical adjustments de-
pend more on inertia in government spending on goods and services than they do on taxes 
(which are largely proportional to output).  But they depend even still more on transfer pay-
ments. Besides calling for different series for discretionary fiscal policy if ratios serve, these 
results also raise questions about the general policy advice to “let the automatic stabilizers 
work.”  
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I. Introduction 
  Studies of discretionary fiscal policy often center on the “cyclically adjusted budget bal-
ance,” or the budget balance following an adjustment for the part that depends on an automatic 
response to events. It is also often assumed that all of the adjustments to the cycle come from 
taxes and unemployment compensation. In addition, following cyclical adjustment, the analysis 
of discretionary fiscal policy frequently concerns the ratio of the cyclically adjusted government 
balance to output or potential output rather than the level. We shall put forward two criticisms 
of this procedure. First, many of the automatic responses to events result from other transfer 
payments besides unemployment compensation, including payments for pensions, sickness, 
subsistence, invalidity, childcare and subsidies of all sorts to firms. Second, if the issue is the 
ratio of the cyclically adjusted budget balance, the cyclical adjustment should be for the ratio 
rather than the level. Otherwise, the estimates of the cyclical adjustment are inefficient. Accord-
ing to both arguments, the usual estimates of the series for discretionary fiscal policy are often 
incorrect. The first criticism always applies when there is recourse to official sources for figures 
for the “cyclically adjusted budget balances” since those figures are constructed on the assump-
tion that taxes and unemployment compensation are the sole elements of the budget that re-
spond to the cycle.  The second criticism follows whenever the subsequent analysis focuses on 
ratios. 
  If the analysis relates to the ratio of the budget balance to output, then the problem of 
estimation is not the only issue. Some important conceptual differences also arise. Interestingly, 
the recent report of the European Commission on Public Finances in EMU for 2004 (European 
Commission (2004)) recognizes these differences (Part II, chapter 3 and Annex II). As the re-
port observes, if the ratio of the government balance to output is the issue, then only progressive 
taxes can contribute much to stabilization over the cycle. Proportional taxes will do little, if 
anything, to stabilize. Any stabilizing response of the budget to the cycle probably will come 
mostly from the spending side and will arise because of inertia in government expenditures on 
goods and services. During a recession, the ratio of government spending on goods and services 
to output will automatically rise if the spending is unaffected while output falls. Not only are 
these observations in the recent report correct, but it is also difficult to know how well they are   2
understood since they are rarely acknowledged.  
A further conceptual issue must be raised right at the start. The part of the budget bal-
ance that responds without delay to the cycle independently of any fresh political decision-
making might not be entirely beyond potential discretionary control and therefore might not be 
“automatic” in the full sense of the word. This applies especially to government spending on 
goods and services, which we usually consider to be under potential discretionary control. For 
this reason, we will refer to “non-discretionary fiscal policy” as a more general term than 
“automatic fiscal policy” or “automatic stabilization.” On the other hand, within the same cal-
endar year the cyclical responses of transfer payments for health, retirement, subsidies to firms, 
or anything else, result predominantly from the application of existing laws apart from any dis-
cretionary behavior by government officials. By and large, whatever is automatic about the im-
mediate responses of taxes and unemployment compensation to the cycle is also automatic 
about the immediate responses of the rest of transfer payments. Thus, we will treat all responses 
of transfer payments to the cycle as automatic.  
  While official estimates of automatic stabilization generally distinguish 5 different ele-
ments of the government budget balance (household direct taxes, business direct taxes, social 
security contributions, indirect taxes and unemployment compensation) and study each of them 
separately, see Giorno et al. (1995) it is also official practice to estimate the cyclical response of 
the 5 respective bases on which these 5 tax and spending items rest, and then to apply the na-
tional tax code or else to assume a unitary elasticity of response to the base in order to derive 
the 5 items, whichever seems more appropriate. Van den Noord (2000) offers an up-to-date, 
clear and detailed review of the method (in the OECD version, used by the EC as well).1 we 
shall deviate from this official procedure in three ways. First, we abandon the preconception 
that unemployment compensation is the only type of transfer payment that responds automati-
cally to the cycle. From the outset we analyse a far finer disaggregation of transfers, or social 
                                                           
1 To quote from van den Noord’s summary: “First, the elasticities of the relevant tax bases and 
unemployment with respect to (cyclical) economic activity, i.e. the output gap, are estimated 
through regression analysis. Next, the elasticities of tax proceeds or expenditure [unemploy-
ment compensation] with respect to the relevant bases are extracted from the tax code or simply 
set to unity in cases where proportionality may be assumed. These two sets of elasticities are 
subsequently combined into reduced-form elasticities that link the cyclical components of taxes 
and expenditure to the output gap.”   3
cash benefits, than has been presented in the literature to date. To the best of our knowledge, we 
are the first to combine data from the 2005 releases of the OECD’s Economic Outlook and So-
cial Expenditure databases for the analysis of the operation of automatic stabilizers. Second, we 
examine the non-discretionary responses of the expenditure and revenue components of the 
budget in both levels and as ratios of output separately. Both of these deviations follow from 
our opening remarks. As a third deviation, we will also rely entirely on simultaneous-equation 
methods of estimation. This next departure deserves a separate word.  
Simultaneous-equation estimation methods have several advantages. The relevant taxes 
and transfers depend on distinct tax schedules and benefit entitlement rules of varying complex-
ity, these can change over time and involve different collection periods and delays. From this 
standpoint alone, there is something to be said in favor of estimating cyclical responses directly 
rather than inferring them from some preset figures after studying responses of the various tax 
bases, however well founded those preset figures may be. In addition, the cyclical responses of 
different tax bases and unemployment (the relevant base concerning unemployment compensa-
tion) will tend to be correlated. Hence, the residuals in the separate estimates of these bases will 
be correlated too. On this ground, seemingly unrelated regression would appear to be fitting. 
Finally, taxes and government spending could have a reciprocal effect on the cycle, even within 
a year. Thus, simultaneous-equation estimation that acknowledges the potential endogeneity of 
the cycle is appropriate.  
 
II. The framework 
 
  At issue then is the response of government revenues and expenditures to environmental 
factors independently of discretionary policy. Therefore, we want to adopt a specification that 
does not reflect the aims of the authorities. Nothing concerning official expected values and of-
ficial objectives, as such, should enter.  In addition, the focus should be on reactions to changes 
in a short enough period to preclude discretionary policy. Changes in tax regulations take sig-
nificant time. So do fresh spending decisions. As regards spending, the European Commission 
(2004) underlines the delays:   4
 
Taking into account relatively long recognition lags, the complexity and slowness of budgetary 
processes and the political economy of political inaction, a viable working hypothesis over the 
short term, for instance one year, is to assume full inertia or full adherence to spending plans i.e. 
to assume that spending is not adjusted for unexpected short- (sic) or windfalls of growth (An-
nex II.2). 
Canzoneri et al. (2002) take the same view. There are three variables that are likely to affect 
government revenues and expenditures even within a year and to do so fairly automatically: 
output, inflation and the nominal rate of interest. Deviations of output (Y) from potential output 
(Y*) are of particular interest, since the ultimate aim is to distinguish between discretionary and 
non-discretionary fiscal policy.  
On these general principles, we decided to study the current yearly impact of first differ-
ences in Y−Y* (as present in the OECD database), or the output gap, on first differences in gov-
ernment receipts and expenditures. Especially because of the first-difference form, this focuses 
on short run responses. We also admitted non-discretionary effects of inflation and the interest 
rate into the analysis. But while using first differences for inflation, we kept the interest rate in 
levels, on the ground that any automatic influence of this variable on the government budget 
would depend largely on initial debt and therefore could be cumulative. If the interest rate does 
have a cumulative effect on the interest payments on the debt, its level could affect the first dif-
ference of the budget balance just as well as the level. While we stuck to these initial choices 
throughout, it turns out that the use of levels or first differences for inflation and the rate of in-
terest makes almost no difference. In addition, better estimates of current responses may result 
from the presence of lagged influences. Thus, we also included the lagged level and the lagged 
first difference of the dependent variable in the estimates. Further, we added a trend and dum-
mies for six-year intervals (1985-90, 1991-96, 1997-2002). Since the data concerns a panel of 
different countries, we included country fixed effects too.  
The sample period used in estimation is limited by the Social Expenditure database. All 
of the country data entering into the statistical analysis runs to 2001. In most cases the data is 
available from 1980, but in a small number of countries a shorter span of data was available, so 
we have worked with an unbalanced panel spanning 21 OECD countries (including 14 of the 
then 15 members of the European Union) and a total of 367 observations. The missing EU 
member is Luxembourg, and the 7 OECD countries outside the EU are Australia, Canada, Ice-  5
land, Japan, New Zealand, Norway and the US.  
III. The estimates in levels and ratios 
 
  In general, the lagged level and first difference of the dependent variable as well as the 
time trend are almost always insignificant and do not affect the results. Therefore, even though 
the analysis allows for some delays in responses, the dynamics are totally negligible. No lagged 
effects occur. On the other hand, the six-year intervals often matter and the country fixed effects 
generally do. 
Table 1 contains aggregate results for 21 OECD countries showing the response of the 
net public surplus to the cycle and also for revenues and expenditures estimated. The panel on 
the left shows the results in levels; and the panel on the right in percentages. The notes to Table 
1 recapitulate the entire specification from start to finish. For the reasons outlined above, our 
preferred estimates are those using instrumental variables for the net public surplus and the 
jointly estimated three stage least squares results for revenues and expenditure. Let us examine 
the levels results first. 
a.  Levels  
In the case of levels, the dependent variable on the left and the output gap on the right are in 
identical units, namely, home currency at current prices. Thus, the coefficient of the output gap 
gives a meaningful figure. For example, for the members of EMU, it states by how many cents 
the budget will respond to a movement of the output gap of one euro. The table only reports the 
coefficients on the output gap and their associated standard errors and t or z statistics (for OLS, 
IV and 3SLS estimates respectively), since coefficients on the change in inflation (∆π) and the 
interest rate (rL) do not have any clear meaning. The measure of the inflation rate is the implicit 
price of GDP. That of the interest rate rL is the long term interest rate. We experimented with 
both the short term and the long term interest rate in the OECD database, and the long term one 
is much more important.  
 
 
   6
 
Table 1: Estimation Results for main aggregates 
 
   LEVELS             RATIOS            
 n=348  Coef  Std. Err  T  P>|t|  Adj R-sq  Coef  Std. Err  T  P>|t|  Adj R-sq 
1. Net Public Surplus (NLG) 
OLS  0.441  0.03 13.0  0.000  0.499  0.341 0.05 7.1  0.000  0.466 
IV  0.704  0.05 14.2  0.000  0.386  0.356 0.08 4.6  0.000  0.466 
2. General Government Expenditure (YPGT) 
OLS  0.094  0.03 2.7  0.007  0.669  -0.296 0.04 -7.7  0.000  0.620 
IV  -0.404  0.07 -5.9  0.000  0.440 -0.403 0.06 -6.4  0.000  0.603 
3SLS  -0.157  0.05 -3.5  0.000  0.655 -0.384 0.06 -6.8  0.000  0.655 
3. General Government Total Tax and Non-Tax Receipts (YRGT) 
OLS  0.488  0.02 20.9  0.000  0.848  0.037 0.04 0.9  0.348  0.145 
IV  0.503  0.03 15.8  0.000  0.847 -0.063 0.06 -1.0  0.312  0.121 
3SLS  0.499  0.03 16.8  0.000  0.866  0.000 0.00 0.9  0.364  0.246 
Notes: 
All the dependent variables are in current prices. t or z statistics in parentheses (z in case of 3SLS estimates). In 
case of 3SLS pseudo R
2s are reported. 
The general estimation form for all 12 equations is:  
∆A = ao + a1 ∆B + a2 ∆π + a3 rL + a4 t + a5 C + a6 D + a7 (∆A)–1 + a8 ∆–1(∆A) + u 
where:  
∆A is the first difference of the dependent variable  
A is either net public surplus, revenues, expenditures or in the ratio regressions these three divided by Y.  
Y: output (GDP) in current prices    
Y*: is potential output in current prices    
∆B is either the first difference of Y–Y* or Y/Y* 
π is the rate of inflation as measured by the GDP deflator (percentage)        
∆π is the first difference of π 
rL is the long term rate of interest (percentage) 
t is a time trend 
C is a matrix of country fixed effects 
D is matrix of dummies for the 6-year intervals: 1985-90, 1991-96, and 1997-2002 
(∆A)–1 is the lagged level of ∆A (in notation with usual time subscripts, it is At–1 – A t–2) 
∆–1(∆A) is the lagged first-difference of ∆A (in notation with usual time subscripts, it is 
   (At–1 – A t–2) – (At–2 – A t–3)) 
u is a disturbance term with the usual properties 
n is the number of observations. 
                         
The instruments for ∆B,  ∆π and rL, where applicable, are t , the time trend, C, the country fixed effects, D, the 
dummies for the six-year time intervals, B–1 and (∆B)–1 and ∆–1(∆B), the lagged level, the lagged first difference 
and the twice-lagged first difference of B (either Y–Y* or Y/Y*), g–1 and g–2, the one-period and two-period lagged 
growth rate of Y, π–1 and (∆π)–1, the lagged level and the lagged first difference of inflation, G–1 and (∆G)–1, the 
lagged level and the lagged first difference of public expenditures, T–1 and (∆T)–1, the lagged level and the lagged 
first difference of taxes, U, U–1 and (∆U)–1, the level, lagged level and lagged first difference of the rate of unem-
ployment and either (Y–Y*)US, ((Y–Y*)US)–1 and ( ∆(( Y–Y*)US))–1 or (Y/Y*)US, ((Y/Y*)US) –1 and ( ∆((Y/Y*)US) )–
1, regarding the level, lagged level and lagged first difference of the US GAP (except for the US, where the EU 
GAP serves instead). When instrumenting ∆π and rL the twice-lagged first difference of either ∆π or rL replaces ∆–  7
1(∆B).  
  In the first section of the table, the dependent variable is the net public surplus. The co-
efficients are highly significant. Both estimates are also comforting, since they are in the gen-
eral vicinity of the typical figures. These typical figures are remarkably close to .5 for either 
grouping, at least in previous applications of the OECD method (see Giorno et al (1995), Buti 
and Sapir, eds. (1998, p. 132), and van den Noord (2000)).  However, the OLS estimates in 
rows ignore any reciprocal influence. The next estimates correct for this neglect by introducing 
instruments for ∆(Y−Y*), ∆π and rL. The chosen instruments are listed in the notes to Table 1. 
They include, among others, the lagged values of aggregate taxes and spending – the two vari-
ables whose reciprocal effect on ∆(Y−Y*), ∆π and rL is our main concern. The instruments de-
signed to take account of the output gap require a special word, since this variable is particularly 
difficult to forecast by construction. With regard to the gap, we made two special choices. First, 
we assumed that fiscal policy does not affect unemployment within the current year. Accord-
ingly, we included current unemployment among the instruments. Second, in line with Galí and 
Perotti (2003), we used the current output gap in the US as an instrument for the other 20 coun-
tries in the study and the current output gap in the EU (as reported by the OECD) as an instru-
ment in the case of the US. These particular two instruments, which relate to contemporary val-
ues (unlike the rest), notably improve the fit. In their presence, the R
2s for ∆(Y−Y*) approxi-
mately double, going up to around 50-60 percent. The R
2s for ∆π that result from the instru-
ments are always a bit worse, closer to 40 percent, and those for rL notably higher, around 90 
percent.  
As seen from the IV estimates, following introduction of the instruments, the estimates 
of the influence of the output gap on the net public surplus rise from .44 to .70. This is not a sat-
isfactory result. The failure to consider the reciprocal influence of fiscal policy on current per-
formance when using e OLS should have led to overestimation, not underestimation, of non-
discretionary fiscal policy. To explain, suppose that a cyclical rise in output raises net govern-
ment receipts. In principle, the rise in the government surplus should limit the increase in out-
put. If it does, then the correction for the reciprocal influence means raising the swings in ∆(Y–
Y*) above observed levels: that is, substituting higher positive values of ∆(Y–Y*) in expan-
sions and higher negative values of it in contractions. On the other hand, following the cyclical   8
corrections, the series for the net government surplus stay the same. Thus, regressing the latter 
series on the corrected (larger absolute) values for ∆(Y–Y*) should yield lower coefficients. 
The opposite happens. Notwithstanding, we consider the estimates with the instruments prefer-
able on general statistical grounds.  
  The next results relate to the elementary decomposition of the net government surplus 
between taxes and spending. Separate IV estimation of the tax and spending equations with the 
same instruments as before for ∆(Y−Y*), ∆π and rL yields a somewhat higher estimate for the 
impact of the output gap on the net public surplus for the OECD21 (.503 in section 2, minus 
−.404 in section 3 gives .907). However, the trouble with these estimates, as indicated earlier, is 
that the equations for taxes and spending should be estimated simultaneously. Three stage least 
squares estimates for a 5-equation system containing equations for ∆(Y−Y*), ∆π and rL in addi-
tion to taxes and spending improve the precision of the estimated coefficients and the impact of 
the cycle on taxes drops slightly to 0.499 while that on expenditures drops (in absolute terms, 
from –.404 to –.157). The basic outcome of using 3SLS is to improve precision and increase the 
plausibility of the impact of the output gap on the net public surplus in the OECD21. After in-
troducing 3SLS, the impact on the public surplus approximates .65.  
  It is interesting to compare these results for taxes and expenditures, with received ideas. 
Automatic stabilization is currently supposed to come essentially through taxes. Unemployment 
compensation − the only relevant spending item − makes up less than 10 percent of tax receipts 
in most countries (often much less), and therefore cannot compare in importance with taxes un-
der proportional taxation (or anything resembling it). Thus, the results conform better to stan-
dard views on automatic stabilization on the tax than the spending side.  The coefficient of the 
output gap of .499 for taxes in the OECD21 is particularly close to what we would anticipate 
from earlier work on automatic stabilization.  However, the –.157 estimate for expenditures in 
the OECD21 looks high compared to Giorno et al. (1995) and van den Noord (2000)). We shall 
come back to this issue below. But for the moment let us turn our attention to the revised esti-
mates if we simply substitute ratios of output as the dependent variables and correspondingly 
substitute Y/Y* as the output gap.  
   9
b. Ratios 
  Ratios often serve in the analysis of fiscal policy. Quite apart, the case for using them is 
strong. Stabilization policy relates to smoothing economic performance or keeping output close 
to potential. It does not essentially concern long run production and growth in the level of out-
put. Accordingly, analysis of fiscal policy often focuses on keeping the ratio of output to poten-
tial output close to one. As a result, even in cases where study focuses on a single country (and 
there is therefore no interest in using ratios simply to promote international comparison), the 
critical fiscal policy variable is often the ratio of the net budget balance to output, and the criti-
cal problem is to determine this ratio in the absence of non-discretionary responses to the envi-
ronment. In line with these remarks, the European Commission centers on the ratio of the 
budget balance to output in its surveillance of country members’ adherence to the Stability and 
Growth Pact (European Commission (2004), Part II, ch. 3).  
Notwithstanding, in analyzing discretionary fiscal policy, studies often correct the 
budget balance in levels for non-discretionary responses and subsequently merely divide by 
output in order to obtain the ratios of cyclically adjusted figures to output or potential output. 
The European Commission is not the only one to do so. Two leading recent academic examples 
are Taylor (2000) and Galí and Perotti (2003). Both explicitly proceed from cyclically adjusted 
figures in levels based on official numbers (from the U.S. Congressional Budget Office in one 
case, the OECD in the other) to subsequent division by potential output in order to analyze dis-
cretionary fiscal policy.  
If potential output were perfectly deterministic and not subject to any shocks, there 
would be nothing wrong with this last practice (that is, because of the division by potential in-
stead of observed output). The division would then not call for any difference in estimation pro-
cedure at all, and the choice of dividing by potential output would be a critical one indeed. 
However, potential output is subject to supply shocks. Thus, if ratios of output are the matter of 
interest, direct estimates of the correction of this ratio for the cycle will yield more efficient es-
timates, regardless whether we divide by observed or potential output. A further benefit will be 
to clarify the stabilizing forces at work. In the absence of a separate estimate of the ratios, as   10
such, these forces acting on the ratios remain in the background, even in the dark.2 As for the 
choice of observed or potential output, we shall center on ratios of observed output here, since 
in any shift of focus on ratios, estimates of automatic effects of Y/Y* on the original data de-
serve priority, in my opinion. 
The results in the right portion of Table 1 begin with OLS estimates of the ratio equa-
tions. As evident, a cyclical expansion notably raises the ratio of the net public surplus to out-
put. A one percent rise in Y/Y* increases this ratio by over one-third of a percent (.341). So far, 
so good: the impact of the cycle on the government balance is stabilizing, just as it was before. 
Once again, if we introduce instrumental variables for ∆(Y/Y*), ∆π and rL, the cyclical influ-
ence goes up, though less markedly, it rises to .356.  There is no need to pause once more on the 
separate IV estimates of taxes and spending.  If we go directly to the preferable simultaneous 
3SLS estimates, we find that the impact of the cycle on the net public surplus is around .381, 
but the most striking result of all is that the response comes entirely from a stabilizing move-
ment in expenditures.  The freely estimated coefficient in the revenue equation is close to 0 and 
is statistically insignificant, hence revenues appear to move proportionately with output. By 
contrast, government spending moves in the stabilizing direction. This stabilizing movement in 
the expenditure ratio is largely the outcome of a smaller percentage movement in the numerator 
than the denominator.3 These results conform with expectations, as observed near the start in 
connection with the Commission. Once we reason in terms of ratios, we can no longer expect 
much non-discretionary stabilization, if any, to come from revenues but must expect it to come 
largely from spending. However, major questions remain outstanding. How much of the rele-
                                                           
2The most recent report on public finances in EMU of the European Commission (2004) edges 
toward this position. First, the report recognizes major conceptual differences when study con-
cerns the ratio of cyclically adjusted budget balances to output, as mentioned at the start. Next, 
the report also recognizes an issue of estimation if ratios to output serve because the predicted 
ratio to output then depends not only on the predicted value of cyclically adjusted budget bal-
ances, but also the predicted ratio of output to potential output Y/Y* (Section 3.3 of Part II and 
Annex II). In other words, based on the report, forecast errors in Y/Y* affect both the numerator 
and the denominator in the ratio. But according to my reasoning, the difficulty lies deeper: it is 
inefficient to estimate the numerator separately.  
3 Arreaza et al. (1999) probably deserve credit as the first to bring attention to the issue. Rea-
soning in ratios, they conclude that taxes are destabilizing and government spending is stabiliz-
ing in the OECD and the EU.  Mélitz (2000) notes the seeming unorthodoxy of their stand 
(without siding with them, as might have been right).     11
vant stabilization results from inertia in government consumption and investment? How much is 
instead the work of transfer payments and is therefore automatic in the usual sense? To answer 
this question we must further decompose the data.   
 
IV. Further decomposition of government receipts and expenditures 
  As long as any further decomposition of government spending between goods and ser-
vices and transfers is essential, why not exploit all of the information available in the OECD 
databases? On the revenue side, OECD Economic Outlook also allows tax revenues to be split 
into direct taxes, both for businesses and households (TY = TYH + TYB) , social security con-
tributions received by government (SSRG) and indirect taxes (TIND). On the spending side, 
Economic Outlook allows us to breakdown general government total expenditures into final 
consumption expenditures (CGAA), and its wage (CGW) and non-wage components (CGNW), 
Social Benefits Paid (SSPG), net capital outlays (CAPOG), Subsidies (TSUB), other net Trans-
fers and net property income (NPY) respectively.  
However, this Economic Outlook classification is far from adequate. Social benefits 
paid embrace too many things: payments for pensions, sickness benefits, invalidity, unemploy-
ment, subsistence, income support and childcare. Consider just one example, we would clearly 
expect pensions, both age related, and those related to early retirement, to respond to the cycle 
in a stabilizing manner. Cyclical upswings are likely induce people to work longer and to delay 
their pension receipts. Pensions are also very expensive, and in aggregate represent a sizeable 
part of social benefits paid. In addition, unemployment compensation probably also responds 
counter-cyclically, though only with a lag (unless there is a rise in the number of people who 
qualify for benefits within a year during a contraction among those who are already unem-
ployed, which is possible). However, it is not clear that payments for childcare should move 
counter-cyclically. In principle, we would argue that these individual components should be 
analyzed directly. While system estimation is likely to retain advantages, we argue that the ap-
propriate form of estimation should be conducted in a manner that allows their cyclical sensi-
tivities to differ.  
Using the OECD’s Social Expenditure database we are able to operationalize a more de-  12
tailed breakdown of transfer payments than has than has previously been employed in this lit-
erature. into age related expenditure. Specifically we breakdown Economic Outlook series So-
cial Benefits Paid by Government (SSPG) into AGEI = old age cash benefits, including early 
retirement pension), incapacity-related benefits (ICR = cash benefits related to disability, occu-
pational injury and disease but excluding sickness benefits),  unemployment compensation and 
severance pay (UC), paid sick leave (SIC = cash payments relating to occupational injury and 
disease and other sickness daily allowances), a category combining family, housing related and 
other cash benefits associated with income maintenance (OTH) and a residual required to en-
sure consistency between the two databases (social benefits in kind less public cash benefits, 
SSPGX = SSPG – AGEI – ICR – UC – SIC – OTH).   
In fact, the Social Expenditure database can also help clarify elements of general gov-
ernment current (or consumption) expenditure, CGAA. This aggregate actually includes goods 
and  services produced for collective consumption (such as security and justice) as well as 
spending by the government on goods and services that are for individual consumption (health 
care, housing, education, and so on.). Among these the Social Expenditure database offers data 
on health benefits in kind. If we are willing to forfeit the possibility of separating government 
current spending into its wage and non-wage components, we can instead break out health bene-
fits in kind from the total government consumption expenditures (HLTH) while keeping current 
spending excluding health CXHLTH=CGAA-HLTH).  This turns out to be helpful. 
  Table 2a summarises results for a number of alternative disaggregated variants of three-
stage least squares systems. Each system includes an equation for each of the revenue and 
spending items, plus three equations for the sources of non-discretionary effects. All the equa-
tions are estimated in levels and concern the the impact of ∆(Y–Y*). Each set of results are re-
ported when the system includes a full set of time dummies and alternatively when only the five 
yearly dummies are included – all the key results we discuss remain robust to across time 
dummy treatment. Table 2b shows the ratio results for and reports the impact of ∆(Y/Y*). For 
the sake of brevity we only we only report the estimates of the cyclical effects from each equa-
tion, along with the standard errors, Z statistics and the probability value of the Z statistic and 
the equation’s pseudo R

























































































A.1 21 countries, n=348, full set of time dummies
Coef 0.175 0.213 0.084 0.055 -- -- 0.029 -- -0.050 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.015 0.024 -0.002 0.026
Std. Err 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 -- -- 0.00 -- 0.00 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00
Z 17.3 28.8 10.3 6.3 -- -- 7.0 -- -13.1 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 4.7 1.0 -0.5 8.1
P>|z| 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -- -- 0.000 -- 0.000 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.000 0.320 0.633 0.000
"R-sq" 0.702 0.771 0.785 0.668 -- -- 0.964 -- 0.929 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.463 0.180 0.244 0.571
A.2 21 countries, n=348, full set of time dummies
Coef 0.171 0.209 0.083 0.046 -- -- 0.028 -- -0.037 -0.008 -- -0.015 0.000 -0.010 0.000 -0.005 0.015 0.012 -0.004 0.025
Std. Err 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 -- -- 0.00 -- -- 0.00 -- 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00
Z 17.0 28.7 10.1 5.4 -- -- 6.8 -- -- -2.6 -- -6.4 1.5 -6.0 -0.1 -7.6 0.6 4.0 -1.0 8.0
P>|z| 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -- -- 0.000 -- -- 0.010 -- 0.000 0.147 0.000 0.908 0.000 0.539 0.000 0.338 0.000
"R-sq" 0.700 0.773 0.782 0.662 -- -- 0.963 -- -- 0.484 -- 0.960 0.817 0.088 0.577 0.460 0.189 0.481 0.245 0.570
A.3 21 countries, n=348, five yearly dummies
Coef 0.170 0.210 0.080 0.045 -- -- 0.027 -- -0.037 -0.008 -- -0.015 0.000 -0.010 0.000 -0.004 0.012 0.012 -0.004 0.024
Std. Err 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 -- -- 0.00 -- -- 0.00 -- 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00
Z 16.8 28.4 9.8 5.2 -- -- 6.7 -- -- -2.5 -- -6.5 1.4 -6.0 -0.3 -7.4 3.8 0.5 -1.0 7.7
P>|z| 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -- -- 0.000 -- -- 0.013 -- 0.000 0.178 0.000 0.777 0.000 0.000 0.608 0.340 0.000
"R-sq" 0.685 0.760 0.771 0.646 -- -- 0.961 -- -- 0.454 -- 0.958 0.809 0.040 0.559 0.429 0.460 0.159 0.208 0.549
B.1 21 countries, n=348, full set of time dummies
Coef 0.172 0.210 0.082 0.046 0.020 0.011 -- -- -0.038 -0.010 -- -0.015 0.000 -0.009 0.000 -0.005 0.019 0.012 -0.005 0.026
Std. Err 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 -- -- -- 0.00 -- 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00
Z 17.1 29.4 10.1 5.3 14.8 2.6 -- -- -- -3.1 -- -6.4 1.5 -5.9 0.0 -7.6 0.8 3.9 -1.2 8.1
P>|z| 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.009 -- -- -- 0.002 -- 0.000 0.140 0.000 0.978 0.000 0.425 0.000 0.250 0.000
"R-sq" 0.702 0.772 0.781 0.662 0.957 0.933 -- -- -- 0.497 -- 0.960 0.817 0.087 0.577 0.459 0.192 0.481 0.243 0.569
B.2 21 countries, n=348, five yearly dummies
Coef 0.171 0.210 0.080 0.045 0.020 0.010 -- -- -0.038 -0.009 -- -0.015 0.000 -0.009 0.000 -0.004 0.012 0.017 -0.005 0.025
Std. Err 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 -- -- -- 0.00 -- 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00
Z 16.9 29.1 9.7 5.2 14.6 2.5 -- -- -- -3.0 -- -6.5 1.4 -5.9 -0.2 -7.4 3.8 0.7 -1.2 7.9
P>|z| 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.013 -- -- -- 0.003 -- 0.000 0.173 0.000 0.841 0.000 0.000 0.483 0.250 0.000
"R-sq" 0.687 0.759 0.770 0.646 0.954 0.929 -- -- -- 0.467 -- 0.958 0.809 0.039 0.560 0.428 0.460 0.161 0.205 0.548
C.1 21 countries, n=348, full set of time dummies
Coef 0.170 0.205 0.083 0.046 -- -- -- 0.042 -0.047 -0.006 -0.013 -0.015 0.000 -0.010 0.000 -0.004 0.016 0.012 -0.004 0.026
Std. Err 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 -- -- -- 0.00 -- 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00
Z 17.0 28.7 10.1 5.4 -- -- -- 12.5 -- -2.0 -4.7 -6.3 1.5 -6.0 -0.2 -7.0 0.7 3.9 -1.1 8.1
P>|z| 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -- -- -- 0.000 -- 0.046 0.000 0.000 0.133 0.000 0.858 0.000 0.493 0.000 0.267 0.000
"R-sq" 0.699 0.776 0.780 0.663 -- -- -- 0.939 -- 0.477 0.899 0.960 0.817 0.088 0.576 0.478 0.191 0.481 0.243 0.571
C.2 21 countries, n=348, five yearly dummies
Coef 0.170 0.205 0.080 0.045 -- -- -- 0.042 -0.047 -0.006 -0.013 -0.015 0.000 -0.010 0.000 -0.004 0.012 0.014 -0.004 0.025
Std. Err 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 -- -- -- 0.00 -- 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00
Z 16.7 28.4 9.8 5.2 -- -- -- 12.5 -- -1.9 -4.8 -6.4 1.4 -6.0 -0.4 -6.8 3.9 0.6 -1.1 7.9
P>|z| 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -- -- -- 0.000 -- 0.060 0.000 0.000 0.169 0.000 0.705 0.000 0.000 0.564 0.265 0.000
"R-sq" 0.684 0.763 0.769 0.647 -- -- -- 0.936 -- 0.446 0.894 0.958 0.808 0.040 0.558 0.448 0.459 0.160 0.204 0.550  14
With respect to levels results all of the tax items have the expected positive signs. They 
are also all statistically significant. Direct taxes, both on business and households (TYB and 
TYH) show a stronger response than do social security contributions (SSRG) and indirect taxes 
(TIND). This result is consistent across all the variants rows A.1 through to C.2. 
On the spending side, total consumption spending by general government (CGAA) 
shows a significant positive response to the cycle. When disaggregated into its wage and non-
wage components the wage element of current expenditure (CGW) shows a more significant 
and stronger positive response than the non-wage component (CGNW), as shown in rows B.1 
and B.2.  Turning to the alternative characterisation of health spending and current expenditure 
excluding health, we find the interesting result that while spending excluding health continues 
to respond positively to the cycle, spending by the government on individuals’ health declines 
so behaves counter-cyclically. This can be seen in rows C.1 and C.2.  
With respect to transfer payments, row A.1 shows a clear and significant counter-
cyclical movement in the aggregate social benefits paid data (SSPG). When we look at the dis-
aggregate picture, in rows A.2 onward we can see that the cycle enters into the age related ex-
penditure (AGEI) equation very significantly and with a negative sign. Unemployment compen-
sation (UC) and other social expenditures (family benefits, income support and housing bene-
fits, OTH) also bear significant negative effects while incapacity related (ICR) and sickness 
benefits (SIC) show no significant response to the cycle. Subsidies attract a positive coefficient, 
as does net property income.  As with the effects on the revenue side, the impacts of the cycle 
on these components of social benefits paid are not affected in a material way by the way in 
which CGAA is demomposed, nor are they markedly affected by the use of the full set of time 
dummies as opposed to the five yearly dummies4.   
 
                                                           
4 One result that is less robust relates to the impact of the cycle on net capital outlays (CAPOG). 
The coefficient is always positive, but its significance relies upon the presence of the full set of 
time dummies, and suggests that further investigation is warranted before placing a lot of em-
phasis on this result. However, we postpone this analysis for the moment to concentrate on the 


























































































A.1 21 countries, n=348, full set of time dummies
Coef -0.015 0.055 -0.031 -0.005 -- -- 0.000 -- 0.000 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -0.020 -0.064 0.008 -0.048
Std. Err 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 -- -- 0.00 -- 0.00 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.02
Z -0.6 2.6 -1.5 -0.2 -- -- -1.1 -- -1.0 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -2.0 -2.2 0.5 -2.1
P>|z| 0.583 0.009 0.130 0.816 -- -- 0.272 -- 0.316 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.052 0.028 0.640 0.038
"R-sq" 0.198 0.323 0.229 0.249 -- -- 0.525 -- 0.610 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.273 0.274 0.289 0.338
A.2 21 countries, n=348, full set of time dummies
Coef -0.022 0.045 -0.029 -0.014 -- -- 0.000 -- -0.199 0.000 -- -0.099 -0.025 -0.067 -0.009 0.002 -0.028 -0.065 0.003 -0.046
Std. Err 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 -- -- 0.00 -- -- 0.00 -- 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.02
Z -0.8 2.2 -1.5 -0.6 -- -- -1.2 -- -- 0.2 -- -9.1 -5.6 -8.9 -1.9 0.3 -2.8 -2.3 0.2 -2.0
P>|z| 0.432 0.030 0.147 0.526 -- -- 0.223 -- -- 0.876 -- 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.063 0.740 0.005 0.022 0.869 0.044
"R-sq" 0.195 0.319 0.223 0.249 -- -- 0.528 -- -- 0.174 -- 0.415 0.437 0.624 0.285 0.307 0.273 0.277 0.283 0.343
A.3 21 countries, n=348, five yearly dummies
Coef -0.024 0.066 -0.054 0.011 -- -- 0.000 -- -0.229 0.000 -- -0.102 -0.028 -0.082 -0.009 -0.008 -0.036 -0.071 -0.004 -0.068
Std. Err 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 -- -- 0.00 -- -- 0.00 -- 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02
Z -1.1 3.8 -3.2 0.6 -- -- -1.1 -- -- 0.0 -- -10.9 -7.2 -11.7 -2.2 -1.3 -4.3 -2.9 -0.3 -3.5
P>|z| 0.295 0.000 0.002 0.559 -- -- 0.267 -- -- 0.994 -- 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.028 0.183 0.000 0.003 0.805 0.001
"R-sq" 0.167 0.285 0.201 0.160 -- -- 0.362 -- -- 0.126 -- 0.350 0.395 0.525 0.258 0.298 0.236 0.218 0.236 0.285
B.1 21 countries, n=348, full set of time dummies
Coef -0.012 0.046 -0.027 -0.015 0.000 0.000 -- -- -0.194 0.000 -- -0.097 -0.024 -0.066 -0.009 0.002 -0.026 -0.059 0.001 -0.038
Std. Err 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00 -- -- -- 0.00 -- 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.02
Z -0.5 2.2 -1.4 -0.7 -0.6 -1.4 -- -- -- 0.1 -- -8.9 -5.3 -8.9 -1.8 0.3 -2.6 -2.1 0.1 -1.7
P>|z| 0.648 0.025 0.168 0.505 0.584 0.169 -- -- -- 0.891 -- 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.078 0.796 0.009 0.035 0.947 0.093
"R-sq" 0.196 0.320 0.222 0.248 0.513 0.389 -- -- -- 0.174 -- 0.419 0.440 0.626 0.286 0.307 0.273 0.281 0.280 0.349
B.2 21 countries, n=348, five yearly dummies
Coef -0.016 0.066 -0.054 0.011 0.000 0.000 -- -- -0.225 0.000 -- -0.099 -0.027 -0.081 -0.009 -0.008 -0.034 -0.068 -0.006 -0.061
Std. Err 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00 -- -- -- 0.00 -- 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02
Z -0.7 3.7 -3.2 0.6 -0.5 -1.4 -- -- -- 0.0 -- -10.7 -7.0 -11.7 -2.1 -1.4 -4.2 -2.8 -0.4 -3.2
P>|z| 0.483 0.000 0.002 0.562 0.596 0.176 -- -- -- 0.989 -- 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.037 0.161 0.000 0.005 0.676 0.002
"R-sq" 0.168 0.285 0.201 0.159 0.366 0.267 -- -- -- 0.125 -- 0.355 0.398 0.527 0.258 0.298 0.236 0.220 0.231 0.293
C.1 21 countries, n=348, full set of time dummies
Coef -0.017 0.034 -0.027 -0.007 -- -- -- 0.000 -0.184 0.000 0.000 -0.089 -0.022 -0.068 -0.007 0.002 -0.029 -0.057 0.001 -0.044
Std. Err 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 -- -- -- 0.00 -- 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.02
Z -0.6 1.7 -1.4 -0.3 -- -- -- -0.5 -- 0.1 -1.5 -8.3 -4.9 -9.2 -1.4 0.3 -3.0 -2.0 0.0 -2.0
P>|z| 0.530 0.098 0.176 0.734 -- -- -- 0.626 -- 0.917 0.137 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.156 0.795 0.003 0.043 0.966 0.051
"R-sq" 0.197 0.315 0.218 0.245 -- -- -- 0.459 -- 0.171 0.374 0.435 0.446 0.622 0.288 0.306 0.272 0.281 0.278 0.344
C.2 21 countries, n=348, five yearly dummies
Coef -0.021 0.057 -0.052 0.016 -- -- -- 0.000 -0.215 0.000 0.000 -0.093 -0.025 -0.082 -0.007 -0.008 -0.036 -0.064 -0.007 -0.063
Std. Err 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 -- -- -- 0.00 -- 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02
Z -0.9 3.3 -3.1 0.9 -- -- -- -0.5 -- 0.0 -1.4 -10.1 -6.6 -11.9 -1.8 -1.3 -4.4 -2.7 -0.5 -3.2
P>|z| 0.364 0.001 0.002 0.395 -- -- -- 0.619 -- 0.965 0.157 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.080 0.179 0.000 0.008 0.634 0.001
"R-sq" 0.168 0.282 0.199 0.156 -- -- -- 0.317 -- 0.122 0.238 0.370 0.406 0.526 0.260 0.297 0.234 0.221 0.228 0.290  16
The results concerning the ratios, reported in Table 2b, are revealing. While household 
direct taxes were shown to move with the cycle, they evidently do so approximately in step with 
output, so that when calculated as percentages of output, their importance vanishes. The same is 
true of indirect taxes. By contrast the direct business tax ratio appears to rise significantly with 
Y/Y* while this effect is to some degree offset by a fall in social security contributions as a pro-
portion of GDP.  The movement of social security contributions though is less well determined, 
and is sensitive to the inclusion of the five yearly time dummies. This decomposition in reve-
nues yields results that are not inconsistent with the story from Table 1, but the disaggregate 
estimates are able to add detail to the overall picture.   
How do these estimates contribute to the overall picture? First, we cannot reject the null 
hypothesis that household direct taxes and indirect taxes keep up with the cycle, while we have 
some evidence (rows A.3, B.2 and C.2) that social social security taxes move in a destabilizing 
direction. In contrast, business direct taxes do better than just keep up with the cycle, and move 
significantly in a stabilizing direction. These results may carry conviction. We would expect 
profits to move more than wages with the cycle, and therefore business direct taxes to be more 
stabilizing (less destabilizing) than household direct taxes and social security contributions.  
Turning to the spending side, the ratio results for the decomposition of social benefits 
paid are striking. From rows A.1 through to C.2 we cannot reject the null hypothesis that gen-
eral government consumption and its wage and non-wage components, as well as its health and 
non-health  components, keep up with the cycle.5 The same is true of aggregate social benefits 
paid (column A.1). However, this aggregate picture masks more interesting behaviour in the 
components of social benefits paid.  
In rows A.2 through to C.2 it is clear that both unemployment compensation and age re-
lated expenditures fall by a significant and sizable percentage of income during cyclical up-
swings. Incapacity benefits as well as subsidies, net capital expenditure and net property income 
also both move significantly in the stabilizing direction, and there is some mixed evidence on 
the significance of the stabilizing moves in sickness benefits. Overall, while various categories 
                                                           
5 These last results, regarding spending, compare well with Lane (2003), who concentrates on 
the cyclical sensitivity of government activity on the spending side.    17
do matter, the response is dominated by and age related expenditures and unemployment com-
pensation.  
With these results in hand, we may return to the question of the extent to which the ag-
gregate stabilizing response of the budget in ratios depends on the contribution of government 
spending on goods and services. The overall stabilizing response of the budget as a ratio of out-
put does indeed owe a great deal to government spending on goods and services. If we sum over 
all the tax and spending items other than residual spending, the stabilizing response of the 
budget balance is of the order of .42-.45. But even when we ignore government spending on 
goods and services, the figure for automatic stabilization is still around .25. Thus, though gov-
ernment consumption and investment is important in explaining the stabilizing movement, 
transfer payments or social benefits paid are even more so. A one percent rise in the ratio of out-
put to potential output leads to a fall in transfer payments of around 20% of the rise, enough by 
itself (apart from the inertia in government current expenditures) to overcome the associated fall 
in the ratio of taxes to output (7% of the rise) by a considerable amount. 
How shall we interpret the greater stabilizing role of transfers than government con-
sumption and investment? To answer, let us go back first to Tables 1 and 1a concerning levels. 
There we see that spending adds about 17% to stabilization in levels. Next, tables 2 and 2a tell 
us that this stabilization comes predominantly from age related cash benefits, unemployment 
compensation and incapacity related benefits, rather than from government consumption and 
net capital outlays. 
 
The tables clearly indicate that government consumption makes no significant impact on 
the stabilization, while a two classes of social benefits paid, adds a lot.  Suppose we interpret all 
the vast bulk of the stabilization as coming from age related expenditures, unemployment com-
pensation, and incapacity related benefits, as it is easy to do. Then everything falls into place. 
Government spending on goods and services plays a stabilizing role in terms of ratios strictly 
because of initial size. But transfers, social benefits paid, do so both on account of initial size 
and a stabilizing movement in level.  While social benefits paid are effectively smaller than 
government consumption and investment in most countries, they still amount to nearly .8 of this   18
spending on average. Hence, the stabilizing response of transfer payments stemming from the 
combination of movement and initial size trumps the stabilizing response of government spend-
ing on goods and services coming from initial size alone.6  
 
VI. Concluding discussion 
  
We have rejected the mere guess that “among primary expenditures [or apart from interest 
payments], only unemployment benefits probably have a non-negligible built-in response to 
output fluctuations” (Galí and Perotti (2003), pp. 542-543).We have also stressed that if, for 
whatever reason, the interest lies in the cyclically adjusted ratio of government budget balance 
to observed or potential output, then the right way to proceed is to correct for the automatic im-
pact of the cycle on the ratio itself. Basing the cyclically adjusted figures on estimates of the 
numerator alone is inefficient. When the proper estimates in the case of ratios take place, along 
with unemployment compensation, age related cash benefits and incapacity benefits appear to 
be especially prominent in automatic stabilization. This finding conforms with our expectations 
and is consistent with the hypothesis that cyclical upswings induce people to work longer and 
delay pension receipts. In contrast, we found no evidence that family cash benefits,  housing 
benefits and sickness benefits make a significant contribution to stabilization. These results 
have contributed to our understanding of where the stabilization comes from. 
  Key remaining questions that demand investigation relate to discretionary fiscal policy. 
If the series for the cyclically adjusted budget balances should be constructed differently, meas-
ures of fiscal policy stances need to be re-estimated. In addition, so do many estimates of the 
impact of discretionary fiscal policy on the economy. This is true regardless of estimation in 
levels or ratios. But in the case of ratios, the problems go further since they relate to the estima-
                                                           
6 The math helps to see. Let spending be x, output y, normal output y* and suppose x = f(y). 
Then d(x/y)/d(y/y*) = (1/y*)[(dx/dy) – (1/y)(x/y)]. The negative value of the second term varies 
with x/y while dx/dy is just the same regardless of x/y. Thus, if dx/dy is –.17 and x/y =.22 (.22 
being about the right figure for government consumption plus investment relative to output in 
the period on average), the first term may easily dominate the second. This is the decisive con-
sideration (even though the reasoning abstracts from differences between the estimates of 
dx/d(y–y*) – or dx/dy, supposedly the same – and d(x/y)/d(y/y*) stemming from the separate 
estimation of the two in a stochastic environment).    19
tion procedure as well as the failure to consider any transfer payments besides unemployment 
compensation.  
A big final question is that of the policy implications. First , as regards the size of auto-
matic stabilization, the answer is easy: the estimates are larger than those in the studies we ref-
ered to at the outset. This is only reasonable since the sources of automatic stabilization are 
wider and cover a number of key elements of transfer payments. In the case of ratios, there is 
still an issue of which disaggregation of government spending on goods and services is more 
reliable, and more work is needed here.  
But there are other policy implications. Consider the popular advice “let the automatic 
stabilizers work.” In the case of taxes and government spending on goods and services, the in-
junction has essentially the same interpretation as before. When reasoning in levels, it advises 
not to interfere with the stabilizing effect of taxes through discretionary government spending. 
When reasoning in ratios, it gives similar advice though this may not be transparent. We see it 
most easily by referring to the case of lump-sum taxation. In that case, the ratio of taxes to out-
put would automatically fall in a cyclical expansion, which would then be destabilizing. But 
since, in fact, taxes rise with income, this does not happen (or less so). Income-related taxes 
thus avert a destabilizing outcome. It follows that, when reasoning in ratios, the earlier injunc-
tion to let the automatic stabilizers work can be interpreted to advise, nearly identically, not to 
interfere with the reduction in destabilization coming from income-related taxes through discre-
tionary government spending. The real policy difference in the injunction to let everything alone 
regards transfer payments. Now the injunction also says “do not interfere with the automatic 
stabilizing effects of transfer payments and subsidies”, and we have demonstrated that it pays to 
be more specific about the important breakdown transfer payments. 
As observed many times in the past, the automatic stabilization coming from taxes is not 
the product of any deliberate design. Ratios of taxes to output rose greatly following World War 
II in the richer section of the world for reasons mostly having nothing to do with desired macro-
economic stabilization. Smoothing of business cycles resulted. However, by and large this for-  20
tuitous outcome meets approval.7 In contrast, in the case of unemployment compensation, 
automatic stabilization was indeed part of the design. The same cannot be said for all the other 
components of social expenditure and subsidies. Some of these, for example agricultural price 
supports, are even the subjects of political opposition. Transfer payments typically concern pro-
grams that are intended for their redistributive effects and that carry some controversial features 
– if only in their detailed configuration. There is little doubt that the motto “let the automatic 
stabilizers work” assumes a different political color if it says, as the data suggests, “let more 
people go into retirement, or on the poverty rolls, or on incapacity benefits and let public aid to 
currently subsidized firms increase during recessions.” Already the principle of letting the 
automatic stabilizers work encounters some opposition because of the international differences 
in the sizes of stabilizers and the lack of any bearing of these different sizes on optimal stabili-
zation (see, for example, Farina and Tamborini (2003)). Any call for unqualified reliance on 
transfer programs could only stir more controversy. Yet, according to the data, that is precisely 
what the motto calls for.  
                                                           
7 Not always. Some people worry that automatic stabilization owes much to big government. 
True, the size of government can be reduced without cutting down automatic stabilization by 
lowering taxes and spending concurrently while increasing the progressiveness of taxation. 
However, progressive taxes can have serious disincentive effects on supply. For an emphasis on 
this conundrum and related discussion, see Buti et al. (2003).   21
DATA APPENDIX 
Code Description  Source 
GDP  Gross Domestic Product (Market prices), Value  Economic Outlook 
GDPTR  Potential Output, Total Economy, Current Prices  Economic Outlook 
GAP1  US Output GAP, EU12 Output Gap for US  Economic Outlook 
PGDP GDP  Deflator  Economic  Outlook 
INF PGDP  Inflation  Economic  Outlook 
IRL  Interest Rate, Long Term  Economic Outlook 
UNR  Unemployment Rate  Economic Outlook 
YPGT  Total Disbursements Government    Economic Outlook 
YPG  Current Disbursements, Government  Economic Outlook 
CGAA  Government Consumption, Value  Economic Outlook 
CGNW  Government Consumption, Excluding Wages      Economic Outlook 
CGW  Government Consumption, Wages  Economic Outlook 
SSPG  Social Benefits Paid by Government  Economic Outlook 
PSE  Public Social Expenditure  SocX  
PCB  Public cash benefits  SocX  
PSE-PCB  Benefits in Kind  SocX 
Residual SSPG  –  PCB   
CAPOG  Net Capital Outlays 
CAPOG = IGAA + TKPG – TKTRG - CKFG 
IGAA=Gross capital formation 
TKPG=  net capital transfers paid + net acquisitions of non-
produced non financial assets 
TKTRG=capital tax and transfer payments received by 
government 
CKFG= consumption of fixed capital 
 
Economic Outlook 
HLTH  Health Benefits in kind  SocX 
YPEPG  Property Income Paid by Government   Economic Outlook 
TOCP  Other Current Transfers Paid by Government      Economic Outlook 
TSUB Subsidies  Economic  Outlook 
YRG  Total Current Receipts  Economic Outlook   22
TYB  Direct Taxes, Business   Economic Outlook 
TYH  Direct Taxes, Households   Economic Outlook 
TIND  Indirect Taxes    Economic Outlook 
SSRG  Social Security Contributions Received by Government   Economic Outlook 
TOCR  Other Current Transfers Received by Government   Economic Outlook 
YPERG  Property Income Received by Government  Economic Outlook 
    
AGE  Age related Social Expenditure: 
= Old Age Cash Benefits excluding early retirement pen-
sion [Code 100 – Code 112] plus Survivors Cash Benefits 
[Code 200] 
SocX 
    
ERP  Old Age: Early retirement pension  [Code 112]  SocX 
    
AGEI =  AGE+ERP   
    
ERL  Early retirement for labour market reasons  
[Code  712] 
SocX 
    
ICR  Incapacity-Related Benefits (Disability, Occupational in-
jury and disease, excluding Sickness)  
[Code 300 – Code 313 – Code 314] 
SocX 
    
SIC  Paid Sick Leave (occupational injury and disease and other 
sickness daily allowances)  
[Code 313 +Code 314] 
SocX 
    
UC  Unemployment compensation / severance pay  
[Code 711] 
SocX 
    
OTH  Other Social  = Family+Housing+Other Cash Benefits 
[Code 500+ Code 800 + Code 900] 
 
SocX 
    
 
OECD Economic Outlook  as provided on the OECD Compendium CD Rom 2005 release 1. 
OECD Social Expenditure Database 2005 release. 
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